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ing Christian Scientists and J eho
vah' s Witnesses. Although it does
not touch on the specific problems
of physicians' l i a b i lity, some of
its conclusions are instructive for
our purposes, es peci a l ly where
c h i l d r e n are made to suffer for
their parents' beliefs.
One of the principles now estab
lished is that a parent who fails to
provide necessary medical care for
his child can be held criminally
liable. "Since the turn of the cen
tury, then, it has been well estab
lished that a parent commits a mis
demeanor when, due to religious
belief, he denies his sick child the
medical aid required by statute,
and that, if the child consequently
dies, the parent is liable for man
slaughter." 12 Faith-healing de
fendants appeal in vain to the reli
gious freedom clauses of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court
of the United States in the famous
Mormon p olyg a my case stated:
"Laws are made for the govern
ment of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with
practices. S u p p o s e one believed
that human sacrifices were a neces
sc1ry part of r eligious worship,
would it be seriously contended
that the civil government under
which he lived could not interfere
to prevent a sacrifice?" 13
It is a n o m a l ous t h at in the

United S tates the pastor or rel gious leader who abets a parent i.1
the criminal neglect of the child ;3
apparently not held liable. "It - ,
clear," says Cawley, "that in Car. ada, criminal liability attaches t )
the pastor or other adult who ac tively counsels a parent agaim t
furnishing his child with necessar
medical care....I submit that her :
is the glaring anomaly in our law
that the parent who denies a chilc
medical aid is punished, while th·
pastor who counsels that denia
goes free." 14
It would not be legitimate to in
fer, howeve r, that a p h ysi c i ar
would be equally free from crim
inal liability. Once he has under
taken the care of the child he ha:
affirmative duties in its regard. anc
for him to advise and abet parents
in their neglect of necessary care
would put him in a position very
different legally, it seems to me,
from that of the pastor.
It must be confessed, however,
that as far as giving or omittin g a
· blood transfusion is concerned, the
physician seems to be caught in a
conflict of legal obligations. He is
obliged not to undertake a surgical
procedure, even if he judges it nec
essary, without the parents' con
sent. This rule is so clearly estab
lished that it needs no elaboration.
On the o t h e r· hand, is he not
obliged to give a blood transfusion
which is desperately needed, when
12 Loe. cit., p. 57, citing three leading
the
parents who refuse to provide
cases: For England, Reg. v. Senior, 1
Q.B. Div. 283, 19 Cox C.C. 219 it are guilty of criminal neglect?
( 1899). For Canada, Reg. v. Lewis, But then, in doing so, he is really
6. Ont. L. Rep. 132, 1 B.R.C. 732 taking it upon himself to decide
(1903). For the United States, People
vs. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201. 6 8 N.E. two questions which in a given
243 (1903).
case, or in a given jurisdiction,
13 Reynolds vs. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
14 Loe. cit., p. 72 and p. 74.
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might be open to disp ute: the
question of fact: "Is this trans
fusion absolutely necessary?", and
the question of law: "Is this trans
fusion part of the reasonable medi
cal care which the law requires
parents ( and others) to provide?"
And finally, as mentioned above,
he would be violating the well
established rule that to o p e rate
without consent is to be guilty of
assault and battery.
In this dilemma it would seem
that the physician's only complete
legal security is in a court order
empowering him to go ahead with,
the transfusion even against the
parents' wishes. But in the absence
of such an order, in a clear-cut
desperate case, I should imagine
that a physician would have little
to fear legally from giving the
transfusion. It does not seem likely
that he would be made to suffer
legally if he could show that the
life of the child was really at stake,
and that the parents' refusal of a
transfusion cons t i tu t e d criminal
neglect on their part. But conceiv
ably it might involve him in a
troublesome and expensive litiga
tion.
It is all very well to hold the
· parents for manslaughter if the
child dies, but is there not available
some legal means of preventing the
tragedy? In Chicago, in 1951, in
the case of the child Cheryl Linn
Labrenz, the courts found a meth
od of circumventing the persistent
refusal of the parents. A petition
wa� filed in Family Court to the
effect that the child was dependent
because of lack of parental care
and guardianship. The Chief Pro
bation Officer was appointed guarMAY, 1955

dian with the right to consent to
n e c e s s a r y blood t r an s f u s i on s.
These were given and the child's
life was saved. Cawley describes
the appeal to the doctrine of parens
patriae in this Illinois case, and in
similar cases in Texas, Missouri,
and New York. 15 Sometimes, how
ever, the legal machinery creaks
and cannot be put into effect with
sufficient dispatch to s a v e the
child.16
If I may be allowed to make
some suggestions regarding cases
involving children, I would stress
the following points:
It is legally inadvisable to make
any agreement or contract with a
parent not to give a necessary
blood transfusion to a child. As
was stated above, in Part II, this
would also be open to moral ob
jections.
The only complete legal security
for physicians and hospital author
ities who would give a transfusion
contrary to the parents' w i s h e_ s
would be in a court order. ConseLoe. cit., p. 57 ff., citing: People ex
rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618,
104 N.E. 2nd 769 (1952); Mitchell vs.
Davis, et al, 205 S.W. 2nd 812 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947); Morrison vs. State,
252 S.W. 2nd 97 (Mo. App. 1952); in
re Seif erth, 127 N.Y.S. 2nd 63 (Chil
dren's Court, Erie County, 1954). For
a discussion of this last case, and fur
ther references to the decided cases,
see "Recent Cases" in 39 Minnesota
Law Review, 118-122 (Dec. 1954).
See also "Comment: Custody and
Control of Children," 5 Fordham Law
Review. 460 (1936). In a Washington
case, where the sur\'.Jery itself involved serious danger to the child, the court
refused to intervene: In re Hudson, 13
Wash. 2nd 673, 126 P. 2nd 765
( 1942).
16 Cawley, lac . cit., p. 62, gives the de
tails of the Grzyb case in Chicago,
Jan. 1954.
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The case of the adult Witness
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.
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tempted suicide. Indeed, the dil atively necessary transfusion, doe
s ference between taking affirmativ:
not cause such troublesome com
 action on purpose to destroy one·
;
plications. The law seems to allow
own life. and merely refusing t >
an adult to run risks with his own
make use of a highly techniecd
life which he may not take with
surgical means of preserving it, i,
the life of his minor child. In a
a very obvious one. And it wou
k.
Supreme Court decision we read
: be far-fetched indeed, to imagin,�
"The right to practice religion
that a phy sician who failed t,,
freely does not include liberty to
transfuse could be held criminall
expose the community or the child
liable on any theory of aidinp
to communicable disease or the
and abetting attempted suicide
latter to ill health or death. . .
. whether his failure stemmed fron
Parents may b e free t o become
sympathy with the patient's be·
martyrs themselves. But it does
liefs, or from the patient's refusai
not follow they are free, in iden
 to permit the transfusion.
tical circumstances, to make mar

The patient's consent is required
tyrs of their children.... " 1 7 And
before a physician may legally
Cawley remarks: "Society and the
perform any surgical operation
courts seem to say: 'We are de
"Operation without consent is a
termined that a child shall grow
trespass. It constitutes a technical
up safely and in good health to
assault and renders the operatin9
maturity, and we will intervene
surgeon liable.'' 10 And when the
17 Rutledge, J., in Prince v. Mass
is Loe. cit., p. 69.
321
U.S. 158, 167
(1944). Quotation of this
p�ssa11e does not indicate agreement
with the decision in the case.
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adult patient who is in his right
mind resolutely refuses to consent
and positively forbids the opera

tion, the physician is absolutely
obliged, leg ally. t o respect his
wishes. The patient's persistence
may result in his death, but I have
not been able to find any authority
for the statement that the physi
cian would incur either criminal
or civil liability by his failure to
force a transfusion or other sur
gical procedure on an unwilling
patient even in these extreme cir
cumstances.20
If surgeons do not dare to.
transfuse a child in the face of the
parents' refusal. and have to re
sort to the cumbersome device of
a court order for legal protection,
even with the child at the point of
death, it seems very unlikely that
they will expose themselves to le
gal liability by not transfusing a
recalcitrant adult, who, being of
right mind, positively forbids the
operation. Given a case of acute
appendicitis with extreme danger
of death, and a patient who in his
right mind resolutely refuses sur
gery, there is only one thing for
the doctor to do: omit the sur
gery and take what measures he
can to save the patient's life. The
· same thing is true of adult trans
fusion cases.
There does not seem to be any
legal machinery by which a court
order can be obtained to empower
a physician to operate on an un
willing adult or by which surgical
20 There is a Massachusetts case in which
the court held that where a patient re
fused to have an x-ray taken, the phy
sician was not responsible for the con
sequences of the patient's own w ant of
care. Carey vs. Mercer, 239 Mass.
599, 132 N.E. 353 (1921).
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treatment can be forced on him.
In my opinion this is as it should
be. The bodily integrity of an in
dividual should enjoy a very high
degree of immunity from invasion
by public authority, as will be as
serted below. This is especially
true when conscientious convic
tions are at stake.
Although the physician incurs
no liability by omitting the trans
fusion, yet he may not be in a po
sition to prove that the consent
was actually refused. If the pa
tient dies and his survivors want
to make trouble, they may be able
to do so unless the physician can
produce something in writing- to
show that consent was refused. If
a physician decides to undertake
the care of a patient who makes
a stipulation or is likely to make a
stipulation against blood transfu
sions, it would be wise for him to
protect himself by a written, wit
nessed order from the patient to
that effect, together with a written
release from all liability in case
the lack of transfusion results in
harm or death to the patient. One
should have professional legal ad
vice in formulating such an agree
ment and release.
Should physicians and hospi
tals, then, simply refuse to under
take the care of a patient who re
jects or is likely to reject a blood
transfusion on religious grounds?
Obstetrical cases offer a special
difficulty _since even though one
a c c eded to the r e q u e s t not to
transfuse the mother, it seems le
gally inadvisable and morally im
proper to make such an agree�ent
regardin!;J her baby. I dou?t 1f a
universal answer can be given to
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the question either for the obstet
rical or for other cases. In some
cases the future need of transfu
sion is so likely that it would be
foolish to undertake the case and
at the same time· deprive oneself
of an essential element for suc
cessful treatment. I doubt, how
ever, whether a physician's repu
tation ( or the hospital's) would
suffer to any extent if a patient
is lost through his own refusal of
a transfusion. But it is not an
easy thing to have to stand by
with hands tied while one's own
patient makes a martyr of himself
on such flimsy grounds. On the
other hand where will the thou
sands of Witnesses get medical
· care if everyone refuses to have
anything to do with them? It
seems to me that acute dilemmas
are going to be sufficiently unus
ual and infrequent so that it would
be too drastic to refuse all Wit
nesses because of the relatively
few desperate cases likely to even
tuate. Witnesses may often start
by refusing. But under the pres
sure of imminent death many will
doubtless find their native common
sense triumphing over their pecu
liar religious indoctrination.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
It is obvious from the foregoing
that general questions of State
power arise whenever there is a
conflict or an apparent conflict be
tween what the individual's con
science may demand of him, and
what the public good or the rights
of other individuals may require.
These are the questions of "pub
lic policy" referred to here. The
general question of Church and
State and religious freedom is too
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large for our discussion. I inten I
to speak of public policy only i 1
relation to blood transfusions an l
closely related matters.
M y reason for discussing th::
aspect of the matter at all is the.:
I consider it important to defen ,
and support the view that it i;
good public policy to concede t
the State the power to give a ne
essary blood transfusion to a chilr
against the sincere but erroneou
religious convictions of the parent
and that it is bad public policy t<
concede to the State the right tc
force an adult to take this mean1
of staying alive against his owr
sincere religious convictions.
It would be considerably easier
to determine these questions of
public policy if we lived in a so
ciety in which the great mass of
the citizens were all in a greement
as to the requirements of the nat
ural moral law and of the positive
laws of God. For in such a case
there would at least be n o conflict
between the laws of the State and
the objective law of God. But
even in such a society one would
still have to contend with the in
dividual erroneous conscience.
One would still have to uphold
the right of the individual to fol
low such a conscience when he
sincerely believed that not to do
so would be a sin off ending God.
And in practical cases one would
still have the task of determining
when a religious practice based on
an erroneous idea of the will of
God was so harmful to the com
mon good or so contrary to the
rights of other individuals that it
had to be restrained.
In the society we live in there
LINACRE QUARTERLY

is no such general agreement as to
the requirements of the objective
moral law. Catholics believe that
from reason and revelation they
are in possession of those moral
truths by which we are expected
to conform ourselves to the will
of God. And this belief is based
partially on the more fundamental
one that the Catholic Church was
founded by Chris( who is the Son
of God, and that this Church has
power to teach authoritatively in
matters of faith and morals. Ob
viously these b e 1 i e f s are not
shared by the majority of ·our cit
izens. It might seem at first sight
therefore, a rather hopeless task
to try to formulate a statement of
public policy which would be con
sistent with Catholic teaching, ac
cep_table to the mass of citizens
and capable of being put into
practical effect.
But the situation is not as bad
as it seems. We have a common
her i t age of Jud e o-C h r i s t i an
thought which still pervades many
of our political institutions and
much .of our national thinking.
There would be quite general
agreement, in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition, that the State should be
allowed to interfere with the indi
vidual liberty as little as possible.
And very few would object to the
doctrine that the State must be
empowered to protect the lives of
its citizens, especially young chil
dren, against fantastic religious
aberrations. It is not impossible,
when people agree on general
principles such as these, to achieve
a considerable measure of agree
ment on practical problems of
public concern as to the life and
health of the people. On the great
MAY, 1955

majority of such problems we can
hope to arrive at practical norms
agreeable to the mass of the citi
zens and not at variance with the,
objective moral law. Exceptions
should be of infrequent occur
rence.
It is the task of moralists and
lawmakers, then, to try to draw a
practical line which will delimit
the powers of the State and the
rights of the individual.-a line
which will protect against reli
gious fanaticism .and at the same
time do justice to natural law
principles and to sincere religious
convictions whether erroneous or
not.
At the outset, in drawing· this
line, two mistakes at opposite ex
tremes are to be avoided. The first
exaggerates State power. The
second exaggerates individual lib
erty.
State p o w e r is exaggerated
when one subscribes to the propo
sition that any interference by the
State can be justified as long as
the majority opinion approves. To
make public policy a mere func
tion of the will of the majority
reduces it in the last analysis to
some form of the doctrine that
might makes right. Such thinking
was utterly foreign to the found
ing fathers of the American re
public. But it has found some·
modern adherents both on the
philosophical and practical level.
They reduce law to the organized
force of the majority that stands
behind it. They use the words
"undemocratic" and "divisive" to
describe those who dissent from
majority views.
Democracy does not mean that
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the majority is right. Majority ample of · human sacrifices men
rule is a practical way of making tioned above in Reynolds vs. th. a republic work. If it were true United States speaks for itself.
that mere force of numbers made
One may assert further, wit)
the difference between right and varying degrees of assurance, tha
wrong, good and bad, then mere the State can and ought to pre
force would be controlling. Might vent the Hindu widow from cast
would make right. But if anything ing herself on her husband's fu.
is clear in the fundamental polit neral pyre; or the Japanese offi
ical thought of our country, it is cer from committing hara-kiri; o
the idea that minorities have a a yone at all from committing sui
?
right to exist and to propagate ode; or the Mormon from prac
their ideas. It was a minority that ticing polygamy; or the evangeli
thought slavery wrong and finally cal fanatic from exposing other:
abolished it. Right and wrong are to snakebite; or the Christian Sci
not determined by a show of el)tist from neglecting ordinar'
hands. They are determined by a medical care for a dangerously
show of minds.
sick child; or a Hindu from goinc
about
unvaccinated in an epidemi:
Now one may take the view
- point of the practical statesman, because he has religious scruplet
that in our system the holders of about using cows to produce vac
minority views must be protected cine, or a Church congregatior
( within limits) whether they are from conducting services when
right or wrong, and that it is hard quarantine has been imposed tc
to say which is which. Or one safeguard the public health.
But it is to be noted of all thes�
may take the viewpoint of the
examples
that the justification ol
Catholic moralist who claims to
State
interference
is based on ur
know· what is right and demands
protection for the minority view gent considerations of the public
when it is right, and for the er- good, or the imperative need to
- roneous conscience ( again within protect some individual person's
limits) when it is wrong. But in right to life and health. The prin
both cases the principle of individ ciple that the State should inter
ual liberty is safeguarded against fere as little as possible with indi
invasion by mere majority might. vidual liberty, especially where
In both cases it is possible to bodily integrity is involved, and
arrive at practical formulations most of all where conscience is
largely agreeable to both view affronted, is acceptable to most
legislators and, I am sure, to
points.
all Catholic philosophers. 0 n 1 y
The mistake at the opposite ex strong, clear. reasons of the com
treme is to imagine that any prac mon good, or the clear necessity
tice, no matter how immoral, or of pr tecting the rights of others.
?
ridiculous, or dangerous must be especially
d e fenseless children
tolerated in the interests of indi can justify State intervention i�
vidual liberty if it is based on such cases. Catholics, being them
sincere religious belief. The ex- selves a minority group, are espe-
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cially jealous of their rights in
this regard and especially loath to
concede to the State a power of
i n t e r v e n ti o n which might be
turned against them.
What then of public policy
where the conscientious refusal of
blood' transfusions is concerned?
Having put the problem in its phil
osophical setting, _ where should
that practical line be drawn to de
limit State power and protect in
dividual liberty in this fiield? My
opinion and the reasons for it can
now be briefly recapitulated.
The State should not be em
powered to force a transfusion on
an adult Witness who is in his
right mind and who, because of
his religious convictions, refuses
it. First, because this would be
an ·unwarranted invasion of his
rights of conscience. The State
cannot show that interference with
individual liberty in such a case is
justified. There is involved here
no urgent need of protecting the
common good, no pressing neces
sity of protecting the rights of
others.
Secondly, for the W i t n e s s ,
given his frame of mind, the use
of a blood transfusion is an ex
traordinary means of preserving
life to which he is not objectively
obliged by the moral law. This
·was the tentative opinion de
fended in Part IL above. The
State should certainly not be em
powered to force an individual to
make use of a surgical procedure
to save his own life, when the
moral law itself does not oblige
him, in the circumstances, to do
so. If the moral law leaves him
free to risk his life to that extent,
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the State should leave him free
also.
Thirdly, if one takes the other
view and considers that a trans
fusion is an ordinary means even
for a conscientious objector, one
should still deny the right of the
State to intervene. The State is
not competent to enforce every
aspect of the moral law. The line
between ordinary and extraordi
nary means of self-preservation is
finely drawn and hard to deter
mine. Can we allow the State, in
the absence of urgent considera
tions of public good or the rights
of others, to become the moral ar
biter, with power to encroach up
on the bodily integrity of the citi
zen? Has anyone ever thought
that the State could force a man
to undergo surgery for appendi
citis, because he was in danger of
death without it? Furthermore, in
the transfusion case, there is also
at stake the right of conscience.
Someone may object: If the
State has the power to ·make at
tempted suicide a crime and to
prevent a person from committing
suicide, then, a pa·ri, it should
have the power of forcing a trans
fusion on an unwilling. conscien
tious objector. For to refuse the
transfusion is the equivalent of
committing suicide. In our opinion
there is no adequate parity be
tween the two cases. The person·
who commits suicide violates a
negative precept of the law of
God: "Thou shalt not kill." The
moral situ�tion of one who fails
to take affirmative measures to
keep himself alive is quite differ
ent, especially when the measures
concerned are artificial. surgical
procedures. It is not inconceivable
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that there should exist a legal tra
dition of obligatory self-preserva
tion, a tradition which would im
pose the affirmative legal duty of
taking certain minimum measures
to stay alive-for instance to take
food and drink. But I find it hard
to conceive a theory of jurispru
dence in which the State would
be empowered to impose on me
an affirmative legal duty to make
use of highly developed surgical
techniques in order to prolong my
earthly existence. To kill oneself
is one thing. Not to avail oneself
of surgery is quite another.
Finally, in the case of the child,
I believe the State is justified in
intervening and giving a neces
sary transfusion, even if the par. ents object on religious grounds.
First, because the child has a cer
tain, objective right to life and to
ordinary medical care to preserve
life, no matter what its parents'
mistaken beliefs may be. Second
ly, where there is a clear-cut case
of necessity, to save an innocent
person from impending death, the
State can intervene even at the
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expense of the erroneous con science. Thirdly, no one object;
to the power of the State to sup ·
ply for the neglect of the parent,
in other, lesser matters. If th ·
parents are cruel or sufficient!·
negligent of health, education
morals, the State, for the good c ·
the child, can remove it -from th
custody of the parents for ex
tended or indefinite periods. /
fortiori it should be empowered tc
save the child's life by seeing tha
it receives a necessary transfusion
This rather long inquiry intc
the scriptural, moral, legal anc
public policy aspects of the trans
fusion case is justified, I hope, b}
the importance of the problems i1
raises. Not the least among therr
is the very human one of dealing
with the stubborn sincerity of thf
Witness. I suggest patience, when
their intransigence becomes irri
tating, and still more patience
when their mistaken zeal attacks
the Church of Christ. Our hos
pitals and physicians can show
them by example that the charity
of Christ is all-embracing.
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Catholic Teaching Hospitals
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ANY of the b�st general hos
.
pitals m this country are
conducted u n d e r Catholic aus
pices. But proportionately few of
t h o s e Catholic institutions are
conspicuous for their teaching
programs. That deficiency �s to
our discredit and to our. disad
vantage. To our discredit. be
cause it is in direct contrast to the
role which the Church has always
played in the propagation of sci
entific truth; to our disadvantage,
because we are thereby ignoring
one· of the best means at our dis
posal for insuring the excellence
of medical standards in our hos
pitals for the future.
The tremendous good which is
accomplished in our Catholic hos
pitals-thanks largely to the �n
selfish devotion of our nursmg
sisters and hospital chaplains, and
to the very practical faith of Cath
alic doctors and nurses-is none
theless so common a thing as to
be legitimately taken for granted.
But it often comes as a surprise to
Catholic and non-Catholic alike to
discover that the religious con
cerns of the Catholic hospital tend
to improve rather than to dil�te
the quality of medical care wh1ch
.
our patients receive. The eth1Cal
codes of our hospitals, for exam
ple, are faithfully enforced and
have always forbidden those med
ical abuses which elsewhere are
most frequently the obstacles to
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proper accreditation. Because our
moral standards are so high. we
are fortunately free from the be
ginning of such abuses. Or to put
it another way, it is easier to prac
tice good medicine in our hospitals
because we are irrevocably com
mitted to a sound morality.
Who else, then, is in better po
sition to train the young physician
to the highest medical standards?
And what better reason for adopt
ing an educational program than
that we are most advantageously
situated for the inculcation of
what is best in medicine? The
hospital. the staff, the trainee, an?
the patient - all stand to profit
from such a program. And con
versely, they stand to lose with
out one.
Our interest in medical educa
tion in private hospitals has been
inspired by the growth of a fine
program in Denver over the past
.
eight years. During that length
of time at St. Joseph· s H osp1·taI .
the house staff has increased from
SI·x to twelve interns, with eleven
.
.
residents on the various se�v1ces,
all actively engaged in t:�chmg or
learning the best med1Cme. s�r
gery, pathology, and obstetrics.
The development of the program
was slow during the first few
years, chiefly because th� . staff
was not eager to partic1p�te.
Now, however, with a stimulat'.ng
program well established, teachmg
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